Liberty Legal Foundation and Others Support Eastman

What protections must a state observe before disbarring a lawyer for public speech, legal advice, and constitutional advocacy? An amicus brief supporting John C. Eastman asks the U.S. Supreme Court to draw a clear boundary between professional misconduct and advocacy on contested political and legal questions.

The brief, dated October 5, 2026, was submitted by Liberty Legal Foundation, Project Civica, North Carolina Values Coalition, and five individual amici in Eastman v. State Bar of California, No. 26-336. It supports Eastman’s petition for review of his California disbarment and concentrates on the First Amendment, due process, and the consequences for clients who need independent counsel.

The amici expressly decline to endorse every factual assertion, legal theory, or litigation decision attributed to Eastman. Their argument is that disagreement with a lawyer’s politics or constitutional analysis cannot replace a clearly defined, constitutionally sufficient showing of professional misconduct. Read the introduction and summary (pp. 5–9).

This guide follows the brief’s account and explains the amici’s arguments. It does not report a Supreme Court ruling on those arguments. For the petition itself, see our earlier reader’s guide.

Who filed the brief, and why?

The organizational amici describe interests in constitutional rights, civic participation and election oversight, and advocacy on family, religious liberty, and related policy questions. The individual amici bring experience representing clients and advising on controversial legal matters. They share a concern about the boundary between sanctionable misconduct and legal advice, litigation advocacy, and public debate. Read the interests of the amici (pp. 1–5).

1. What constitutional protections apply to disbarment based on speech?

The brief begins with the severity of what it describes as permanent disbarment: loss of a profession, lasting reputational injury, and a judgment of dishonesty and moral unfitness. The amici argue that when this sanction rests substantially on public speech and legal advocacy, both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause apply with full force.

In their account, the conduct driving Eastman’s disbarment included public remarks, podcast appearances, an essay in The American Mind, election-related communications, and advocacy about the Twelfth Amendment, alternate electors, and the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes. They contend that California treated disputed election claims and constitutional arguments as grounds for professional unfitness without maintaining the required boundary between speech and misconduct. Read Argument I (pp. 10–11).

2. Does a law license reduce protection for public advocacy?

The amici rely on Chiles v. Salazar and National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, usually called NIFLA, to reject a separate, less protective standard for speech simply because its speaker is a professional. They argue that public commentary does not become regulable professional conduct merely because it concerns a client or a legal controversy.

The brief acknowledges the state’s authority to regulate professional conduct that incidentally involves speech. Its objection is to using that principle to regulate speech itself. Similarly, the amici argue that calling speech integral to unlawful conduct requires identifying the independently unlawful conduct; a general connection to legal representation is not enough. They contend that California failed to supply that limiting principle here. Read Argument II (pp. 11–13).

3. Do rules governing trial publicity justify the discipline?

The brief distinguishes Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, which it describes as addressing lawyers’ out-of-court statements that create a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an identifiable pending proceeding. The amici emphasize the connection between that rule and the fairness of a particular adjudication.

They contend that the Bar did not establish such a connection for Eastman’s Ellipse remarks, podcast appearances, or published essay. In their account, the Bar did not show that these communications threatened jury impartiality, the evidentiary process, or the fairness of a specific proceeding. They therefore argue that Gentile cannot support a general power to discipline lawyers for public discussion of elections and constitutional questions. Read Argument III (pp. 13–15).

4. Did California provide fair notice of what speech was punishable?

The amici challenge the use of two California disciplinary provisions: Business and Professions Code §6106, concerning acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and §6068(a), requiring attorneys to support the federal and state constitutions and laws. Their objection concerns the application of these provisions to political expression and contested constitutional theories.

The brief argues that vague standards can leave lawyers unable to know in advance what advocacy will trigger punishment and can give officials room for selective or viewpoint-based enforcement. It maintains that the Bar blurred intentional deception, insufficient verification, disputed factual inferences, and legal theories the tribunal considered unreasonable. The amici contend that this approach failed to provide the clarity and fair notice required before extinguishing a professional license. Read Argument IV (pp. 15–17).

5. Does describing the case as one of knowing falsehoods answer the objection?

The amici say it does not. They argue that the constitutional question turns on whether clear and permissible standards actually distinguished intentional deceit from contested advocacy, rather than on the label attached to the conduct afterward.

According to the brief, the Bar moved between deliberate falsehood, objective unreasonableness, and conclusions that Eastman should have known his claims lacked adequate support. By treating public statements, disputed factual claims, legal theories, and advice as a single course of misconduct, the amici argue, the decision made it impossible to determine whether disbarment rested on narrowly identified knowing falsehoods or on a broader rejection of Eastman’s advocacy. Read Argument V (pp. 17–18).

6. What would the decision mean for clients seeking legal advice?

The brief’s sixth argument turns from the lawyer’s rights to the client’s access to independent counsel. The amici stress that clients often need advice before facts are fully developed or the law is settled, particularly in urgent and controversial matters.

They warn that discipline imposed after the fact under broad standards may lead lawyers to decline representation, avoid urgent cases, soften advice, or abandon novel but lawful arguments. In their view, the resulting harm reaches civic organizations, religious institutions, advocacy groups, candidates, and ordinary citizens whose causes are unpopular.

The amici connect that concern to the way legal doctrine develops through adversarial argument. They contend that a legal conclusion does not become a knowingly false factual statement simply because a court, regulator, or later consensus rejects it. Read Argument VI (pp. 19–22).

7. Why do the amici see implications beyond Eastman?

The brief warns that California’s approach could supply a model for future disciplinary campaigns against lawyers representing disfavored clients or advancing unpopular legal positions. Elections and disputes over government power are especially vulnerable, the amici argue, because they often involve compressed deadlines, incomplete records, and intense public pressure.

Their proposed principle does not depend on the Court accepting Eastman’s views about the 2020 election. They ask the Court to reject the use of vague, politically malleable standards to impose permanent disbarment for controversial claims and constitutional advocacy. Read Argument VII (pp. 23–24).

What the amici ask the Court to do

The conclusion asks the Supreme Court to grant Eastman’s petition and reverse the judgment below. The amici maintain that discipline based substantially on public speech, legal advice, and constitutional advocacy requires a clear rule, proof of the necessary culpability, and a constitutionally permissible ground for discipline.

The requested boundary is between defined professional wrongdoing and punishment for controversial advocacy. The brief argues that a later determination that a lawyer’s statements or constitutional arguments were wrong is insufficient by itself to justify permanent exclusion from the profession. Read the conclusion (pp. 24–25).

Read the original document

The complete brief on the Supreme Court’s website contains 31 PDF pages: a cover, preliminary pages i–v, and numbered pages 1–25. Source links in this guide use the PDF viewer’s page count. Printed page 1 is PDF page 7.

Descriptions of California’s reasoning and the underlying events in this guide are drawn from the amicus brief. The brief’s references to the petition and its appendix point to separate materials. This guide summarizes the amici’s submission rather than independently resolving the factual or legal disputes.