Article III Project Supports Eastman: A Reader’s Guide
Can a state use professional discipline to impose an ideological test on lawyers? The Article III Project argues that John Eastman’s disbarment presents that question. Its amicus brief asks the Supreme Court to apply decisions protecting lawyers with unpopular beliefs and clients to California’s treatment of Eastman’s election-related advocacy.
Filed October 14, 2026, in Eastman v. State Bar of California, No. 26-336, the brief develops two principal arguments: that California’s proceeding bears the features of an unconstitutional ideological test, and that Supreme Court review is needed to prevent political retaliation through bar discipline. It seeks review and reversal of the California judgment. Read the introduction and summary (pp. 1–3).
This guide follows the Project’s arguments and its descriptions of the disciplinary record. Its allegations of political motivation are the position advanced in the brief.
Who filed the brief?
The Article III Project, or A3P, describes itself as a nonprofit founded in 2019 that advocates constitutionalist judicial reform, separation of powers, and resistance to politicization of the justice system. It says its interest here is in preventing state ethics rules from being used against lawyers because of their representation of political clients. Michael Francisco is counsel of record, joined by James Compton of First & Fourteenth, PLLC. Read the statement of interest (p. 1) and the conclusion and counsel listing (pp. 16–17).
1. What do the bar-admission precedents establish?
The brief begins by acknowledging that states may require legal competence and good moral character. Its proposed boundary is that those qualifications must concern an attorney’s fitness to practice; they cannot become a test of political orthodoxy. A3P treats several lines of Supreme Court decisions as expressions of that principle, even though they arose under different constitutional provisions and in different historical settings.
Its starting point is Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners. In the brief’s account, New Mexico relied on a prospective lawyer’s former Communist Party membership to reject his application on character grounds. The Project emphasizes the Court’s insistence on a rational relationship between admission requirements and professional fitness, and its rejection of the inference that unconventional political beliefs establish bad character. Read the discussion of Schware (pp. 4–5).
The brief then turns to Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Application of Stolar, both decided in 1971. The applicants refused to answer questions about Communist Party membership or membership in organizations advocating the government’s overthrow. A3P emphasizes that refusing those inquiries did not establish professional unfitness. It identifies the plurality character of the opinion in Baird and relies on Justice Stewart’s controlling concurrence, together with his concurrence in Stolar, for the constitutional protection of belief and association. Read the Baird and Stolar discussion (pp. 5–6).
The Reconstruction and civil-rights examples
A3P also invokes Ex parte Garland, which concerned a federal law excluding former Confederate officials from practice in federal courts. The brief focuses on the prohibition against bills of attainder and the punitive character of permanent professional exclusion. It uses that history to show that political restrictions on the legal profession long predate the Cold War cases.
The other example is NAACP v. Button. The brief describes Virginia’s expansion of rules against soliciting litigation in a way that threatened the NAACP’s legal work and its lawyers’ licenses. It argues that the Court’s protection of that advocacy prevents a state from using professional regulation to suppress First Amendment activity. These examples concern different conduct and different constitutional rules; A3P draws from them a common objection to political exclusion from practice. Read the Garland and Button discussion (pp. 6–8).
The argument also concerns the courts’ ability to function. Relying on Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, A3P contends that an independent judiciary depends on independent lawyers. Restricting which arguments counsel may advance distorts representation and the information courts receive. The asserted injury therefore reaches clients and the judicial process as well as the disciplined attorney. Read the independent-bar argument (pp. 3–4).
2. Why does the Project characterize Eastman’s case as an ideological test?
A3P’s application of those precedents turns on its reading of the disciplinary opinions. It highlights the absence of prior discipline, Eastman’s cooperation with the investigation, and character evidence from fourteen witness declarations and five live witnesses. According to the brief, the Hearing Department gave the character evidence substantial weight, and the Review Department recognized extraordinary good character as mitigation. A3P argues that the ultimate sanction nevertheless reflected hostility to Eastman’s beliefs and advocacy. The guide reports that inference as the Project’s argument, not as a separate finding about the tribunal’s motives. Read the character-evidence discussion (pp. 8–9).
The brief next argues that California treated disagreement with Eastman’s constitutional analysis as proof of bad faith. It points to the rejection of his asserted sincere belief in the memorandum underlying Count Six, and to the refusal to credit his good faith. In A3P’s view, the tribunal’s assessment crossed the line from judging professional conduct into enforcing an approved interpretation of the election controversy.
A related objection concerns Eastman’s continued defense of his positions. The Project cites passages criticizing his insistence that his statements were factually and legally justified and his refusal to reconsider the propriety of his conduct. It treats the use of those positions in assessing discipline as evidence of pressure to recant. That is the connection it draws between this proceeding and the earlier belief-and-association cases. Read the discussion of belief, good faith, and recantation (pp. 9–10).
The comparison with Donald Segretti
The brief questions California’s use of Segretti v. State Bar as a disciplinary comparison. It recounts that Donald Segretti pleaded guilty to federal offenses arising from false campaign materials, served a prison sentence, and received a two-year suspension. A3P contrasts that result with the tribunal’s assessment that Eastman’s conduct was substantially more serious.
The Project emphasizes the absence of a federal conviction or federal indictment against Eastman and objects to the disciplinary tribunal’s determination that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 371. It uses that comparison to support its claim of ideological motivation. The disciplinary finding discussed here is not a federal criminal conviction. Read the Segretti and federal-offense discussion (pp. 10–12).
3. What consequences does the brief foresee for other lawyers and clients?
The second principal argument asks the Court to consider what A3P regards as a growing use of ethics complaints against political opponents. Its concern is not limited to conservative lawyers in California. The brief expressly describes the danger to liberal lawyers practicing in conservative states as well. It warns that a state could characterize an opponent’s factual submissions as false and legal positions as baseless in order to punish advocacy it disfavors. Read the argument for review and its application across political lines (pp. 12–13).
The Project predicts two consequences. Lawyers able to move their licenses could gravitate toward politically sympathetic jurisdictions, dividing the profession along political lines. Lawyers and clients who cannot relocate would face a different problem: counsel might soften arguments or avoid controversial cases out of fear for their licenses. A3P again invokes Velazquez to argue that such constraints would undermine confidence in the adequacy and fairness of representation. Read the discussion of professional division and chilled advocacy (pp. 13–14).
To support its claim that the problem is already developing, the brief surveys writing about ethics complaints against Trump-administration lawyers and proposals for more aggressive professional discipline. It also cites proceedings against Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen. A3P characterizes those developments as political uses of licensing power; that characterization remains an allegation advanced by the amicus. Its historical discussion includes disciplinary actions involving Richard Nixon, other officials of his administration, and Bill Clinton, without proposing a general exemption from ethics rules for political officeholders. Read the historical examples, scholarship, and Montana discussion (pp. 14–16).
What does the Project ask the Court to do?
The conclusion asks the Supreme Court to grant Eastman’s petition for certiorari and reverse the California Supreme Court’s judgment. The principle A3P asks the Court to reaffirm is that reasonable competence and character requirements cannot become a means of punishing an attorney’s political beliefs or the cause of a client.
The brief’s argument does not depend on the Court adopting Eastman’s election theories. It asks the Court to review whether professional discipline has been used as an ideological restriction on advocacy, and to clarify the constitutional limits on that use of state power. Read the final argument and requested relief (p. 16).
Read the original document
The complete brief on the Supreme Court’s website contains 22 PDF pages. Printed page 1 is PDF page 6. Source links use the PDF viewer’s page count.
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This guide follows the arguments and descriptions of the proceedings in the brief. For the underlying petition, see our earlier reader’s guide.
A short glossary
Amicus curiae: A nonparty who submits a brief to assist the Court.
Certiorari: The process for asking the Supreme Court to review a lower court’s decision.
Mitigation: Evidence considered in determining whether a disciplinary sanction should be reduced.
Bill of attainder: Legislation imposing punishment without a judicial trial.