SECTION THREE TRANSCRIPT

Tom Klingenstein / John Eastman Interview

May 5th

**Tom Klingenstein:**

So John, in the prior sections, we explored the wrong, the fraud, the ir irregularities in the election, and in the next section we explored the remedy for that wrong, the legal remedy. But in this section, the question is, should you and the President have pursued that legal remedy? That's the question of prudence.

Now I want to start with something that we've covered, but for those who haven't seen the prior sections, um, we want to be clear that you told the Vice President not to reject electoral votes. You said that would be foolish, but rather to delay. Maybe you could just quickly explain that.

**John Eastman:**

Sure. To delay at the request of more than a hundred state legislators who had advised Vice President Pence that there was illegality in their states in the conduct of the election, significant enough to have placed the election in question that the electoral votes for Biden should not have been certified, and they wanted an opportunity now that they were back in regular session to assess the impact of that illegality to determine whether the actual winner of the election had been the one that was certified.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

After January 6th Pence claimed that he was advised to reject, not delay.

**John Eastman:**

Well, his dear colleague letter of the morning of January 6th is very carefully worded. He doesn't say, I advised him to reject. He says, some people have suggested I could just reject, and that was true. I mean, there were articles that have been published uh, that said the Vice President had this authority. And, and the President himself had tweeted that you have the authority to just reject fraudulent electors. Um, but the advice I actually gave to him in person on January 4th was that given that the legislators had, had legislatures hadn't certified alternate slate of electors, it would be foolish to exercise that even if he had that power.

And in these circumstances, I thought it was a weaker argument that even he had that power. But the power to accept their request to delay so that they could assess the impact I thought was within his authority.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay. Now the question of whether it was prudent to go forward depends on a whole host of factors. One of them is Pence, and was there any reason to believe that he would accept your advice?

**John Eastman:**

Well, uh, in a memo that Pence's general counsel wrote to him in early December, he had acknowledged the legal scholarship supporting his authority here. So I thought that, you know, laid out a credible argument on why he might be willing to undertake it.

And of course, in discussions that people were having with him and others, he was deliberately not taking a position one way or another. Now it turns out in hindsight that he wanted to delay as long as possible - what would be a pretty significant break with Trump. Uh uh, and I kind of took stock of him at the meeting on January 4th and realized he wasn't gonna do it.

But even then, there was still some talk that he might recuse himself and that, uh, this President Pro Tem of the Senate, Chuck Grassley, or the next most senior member of the Senate, uh, might step in and fulfill that role.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And the man, uh, who was Pence uh, council's man named Greg Jacobs, who you said early in December, acknowledged the credibility of some of your arguments. But I think he said that in the two weeks before January 6th, he was adamant that this was a nutty position.

**John Eastman:**

Well, Greg Jacob and I never met until January 4th. He never expressed such sentiments to me. Uh, e even in our extended meeting on January 5th, uh, we explored the various uh, scholarship or what have you. Uh, if he had those views that they were nutty and that nobody would, would accept those positions, he never conveyed that to me. Now, maybe he and Pence and, uh, Pence's, uh, chief of Staff, Marc Short, had those conversations among themselves, but they certainly didn't have 'em with me.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, on January 4th, you met with Pence. You were reasonably convinced that Pence would not accede to your advice. You went and told Ru Rudy Giuliani. You told Mr. Giuliani Pence isn't gonna go along. So at that point, should you have abandoned this plan?

**John Eastman:**

Well, again, at that point it was still up in the air whether he would recuse himself or not. Um, so the, the question about whether whoever was sitting in that chair would take this advice, re remained very much open. Uh, and and more importantly, I mean, look, if, if I'm right about the illegality in the fraud, we're talking about one of the biggest political scandals in American history, and it goes back, it goes back five years.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Even on the fourth Pence did not foreclose the delay option.

**John Eastman:**

I had a sense that he wouldn't. Greg Jacob testified that he repeatedly said he would not go along with that. That's not true. And he just said, I'll take it under advisement. I'll continue to meet and we'll continue to discuss these things, and my staff will meet with Dr. Eastman, uh, tomorrow as well. So, so the, the, the claim that he repeatedly told me and the, and the President that he would not do this because he had no authority, that's just utter, utter, utterly false.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Because I think there are a lot of people - I, at one time among them, thought, gee, there's a zero chance that you're gonna get Pence to delay. But once you asked him it was gonna get out and you were gonna feed the Trump overturning the election narrative.

**John Eastman:**

Well when, when he says he's gonna take something under advisement, my sense was that he was not gonna take it. But he was very deliberately avoiding saying that. And, and if I was persuasive at the meetings the next day, he led me, and more importantly, President Trump to believe that he would, that he would take seriously the arguments and reach a judgment. All I can do is take him at his word.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, one of the other considerations is did the legislatures really have enough time in seven to 10 days to make a reasonable assessment. Look, we've had recounts and audits taking months and years, so what would you expect in seven to 10 days?

**John Eastman:**

So there's no question that in seven to 10 days, they could not definitively resolve how many ballots were affected by illegality and fraud. I mean, we're still de debating those questions. But they could determine in that seven to 10 days was there in fact illegality. And how much potential fraud did that open the door for? And if it's bigger than the outcome of the election, can we make an assessment - an educated guess about what the results of that election would have been, but for the illegality. We can't do it definitively, but because of the illegality, the actual burden of proof shifts back on those that are supporting the certification with the illegality, that the illegality didn't affect the outcome.

And I think the legislature, even in seven to 10 days, had they been willing to address this, uh, could have made that assessment. Would it have been a perfect, uh, you know, like a, like an accounting sense of your bank records? No, we're never gonna get that level of perfection. But could it be based on reasonable extrapolations and suppositions? I believe it could have been.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay. We discussed this earlier, and I'm wondering if this is the kind of thing they could have done. They looked at rejection rates that were 4% normally were one 10th of that in this election. They can infer the number of votes that would've been rejected and then make some reasonable estimate of what the effect was on the outcome. That's the kind of thing that they can do.

**John Eastman:**

That’, and, and in fact, courts have done this in, in a relatively short period of time as well.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

But it's just a judgment they make, presumably on good evidence, but it doesn't, it's not at any particular legal standard.

**John Eastman:**

I think that's right. Yep.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

So let's assume that the legislature or legislators came to the view that it was Trump, not Biden that had been elected. Now, what did they do?

**John Eastman:**

Well, they, they say our original certification based on illegal votes was wrong. Here's the correct certification. This is exactly what happened in Hawaii in 1960. There was an election challenge. They determined after the fact and after the Electoral College had met and voted that in fact, Senator Kennedy, rather than Vice President Nixon had won that state. They quickly sent a supplemental or a replacement certification to Congress and Richard Nixon presiding over the joint session of Congress decided to count that slate rather than the original Nixon slate of electors.

He did it unilaterally. He didn't have a vote in Congress.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

So that's so that you think is in support of the VP counts.

**John Eastman:**

Now, now he says, I don't want to set any precedent here, but in fact, he set, he set a precedent, and he did it unilaterally. He did it in violation of the Electoral Count Act because the Electoral Count Act says the, the electors certified on the designated day, um, are to be counted uh, unless both houses of Congress agree that they were not regularly given and both houses of Congress didn't even have a chance to vote on it. So, it was a violation of the Electoral Count Act.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now they could certify Trump, but could they not certify either slate?

**John Eastman:**

They could not certify either slate. And uh, and then the question is, there's a different legal question that remains unsettled. Um, does that change the total number of electors who have been appointed uh, such that a majority of electors necessary to win drops from 270 to some number lower than that, and whoever has a majority at that lower number would be elected? Or are they considered appointed but just not counted, and you would still need 270, neither gets 270, and it goes to the House. That's another very significant constitutional question that has never been resolved.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, there are other things that you had to take into account. Um, mobs. There's a man named Hirschman who was that?

**John Eastman:**

Eric Hirschman was a, a, a counselor to the President, uh, in the White House at the time - not in the White House Council's office as far as I can tell, but just one of these special assistants to the President.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, I think in the January 6th committee hearings, he told you that your plan was completely crazy, that you were out of your f-ing mind. These are all quotes. And you are gonna cause riots in the streets. Now he has you saying in response, well, there have been riots before, and sort of the implication that you were a little bit cavalier.

**John Eastman:**

Well, Mr. Hirschman has two things. He, he's got a vivid imagination. Now, uh, in my, in my relatively few dealings with him, I discovered that he sometimes thinks he says things in his mind and then he portrays it as if he actually said 'em. But he also said in that same sworn testimony that this occurred well before January 3rd in personal one-on-one meetings with Eastman in the White House. Now, I was not in DC until the evening of January 3rd, and I was not at the White House until the afternoon of January 4th. So those conversations never occurred.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

But were there anybody in the White House who expressed sentiments like that?

**John Eastman:**

None. None. There was a meeting I had while we were waiting for Vice President Pence to arrive for the Oval Office meeting with President Trump. I was in Mark Meadow's office with Eric Hirschman with, uh, Pat Cippalone, and I believe with Pat Philban, the deputy, uh, White House counsel. I, I can't remember whether he was the fourth one there or not.

And, and we were, we were sitting on the couch under the chair in Mark Meadow's office and just, just chatting. There was no conversation about the substance of our recommendation, and most certainly, no one said, Eastman, your views on this are crazy. Don't present them to the president. That conversation, nothing like that conversation occurred.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Were there any people in the White House who were supportive?

**John Eastman:**

A again, the only people that I met with were those five, and we didn't have a subsequent conversation.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

I mean, Mark Meadows didn't tell you his views?

**John Eastman:**

He didn't tell me his views. Uh uh, Pat Cippalone, uh, walked in with me to the O Oval Office meeting and was excused by the President. Mark Meadows came in subsequently.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And where was the President in all this?

**John Eastman:**

He was in the Oval Office, uh, at behind the Resolute Desk. And Mark Meadows came in, uh, during,

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And by this time he'd been talked down from rejecting?

**John Eastman:**

Well, not when he excused Pat Cippalone, uh, uh, or Mark Meadows came in, I think early on, and he, uh, he needed something that Mark went out to get.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And this was January 4th.

**John Eastman:**

January 4th in the Oval Office meeting. So it was just the President, the Vice President, uh, Mark Short, Greg, Jacob and me in that meeting.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And at that point, Trump was still insisting or trying to insist that Pence reject.

**John Eastman:**

Well, he had, he had, he had some of these scholarship scholarly articles, which I believe he had read by then and other people that had, uh, urged that the Vice President had the authority to reject contested electors. Uh, and, uh, and, and the President said, “Now you agree with that, right John?” And I said, “Well, it's a lot more complicated than that. Um, and, uh, I, and I think more nuanced.” And then that's when the Vice President asked me directly.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now people are gonna be very surprised. That Trump reads Law Review articles. Are you being straight faced there, John?

**John Eastman:**

No, I am, you know, in my dealings with him over the, over the course of the month of December and early January, um, he, he, uh, he receives and absorbs a lot of information fairly quickly. Um, and on something as important as that, I don't have any doubt that he would've read at least portions of the articles.

You don't get to be President of the United States without having some measure of, of, uh, intellectual capabilities. He also doesn't sleep very much and he doesn't drink and he doesn't smoke. I mean, uh, the guy, uh, the guy's a workhorse.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now let's stay on mobs, because clearly that was a consideration. And so you had to think through what would've happened had there been riots on the street, and it's likely there would've been. So now how do they get quelled? Normally it would be the military. But the military didn't show a lot of support for Trump in the 2020 riots.

**John Eastman:**

Well, uh, one hopes that our military still understands their obligation and the chain of command that stops at the top with the Commander-in-Chief. Um, we, we had some members of the military that I think, uh, uh, made questionable statements even with our enemies abroad about their role in making sure that the, the President, their boss, the Commander in Chief, the only one with constitutional authority. I wouldn't do anything, so

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Did you consider the possibility that if there were riots on the street, the military would actually escort Trump out of the White House?

**John Eastman:**

 (Clears throat) No. Uh, Uh, the conversation at the time was if we got to January 20th and Biden had been certified as the President and Trump refused to leave, would he be escorted out? I th those were stories that were being floated in the Left-wing press. There was zero possibility of Trump refusing to leave, and that would even become a necessary contingency. More seriously though, and one of the conversations I did have with Eric Hirschman was, uh, after January 6th when I said, you know, the Georgia case was was, uh, the federal case was settled against us on Tuesday. We have grounds for an appeal, and I think it's important to get the necessity of having election challenges heard, brought up an appeal, even though the case is otherwise now moot. There's a doctrine in law called Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review. That's an exception to Mootness. And he said, “You know, all I want to hear from you is, uh, is uh,

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, are you talking about, are you talking about the Georgia case that's pending now?

**John Eastman:**

No, no. Different case in Georgia. This was our federal action we filed on New Year's Eve to to say they're not even letting a judge be appointed in the state election challenge. This is now violating Federal due process, and we filed that action. And he said, “The only thing I want to hear from you is peaceful transition.” And he also raised at some point that..

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Who was the he at that point?

**John Eastman:**

Eric Kirschman and he also raised at some point, um, you know, if, if, if there's any effort by the courts to say that Trump won instead of Biden, there'll be riots in the streets.

And my recollection to the best I have it is that, you know, I'm not even, I don't even recall him talking about that, but if he had, I would've said something like that “We should not succumb to mob rule.” Um, that would be mob rule if, if Trump was the legitimate winner. And you're afraid of saying that because of mob's violence, then you're sub subjecting yourselves to mob rule. And that's not the Rule of Law.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay. But your assumption going in, yes, there'd be mobs, but the military would be loyal to civil.

**John Eastman:**

It's, but again, none of my conversations

**Tom Klingenstein:**

No, no.

**John Eastman:**

Dealt with that.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

No, no. But as you are considering. Yeah. Whether to go forward, I assume you took into account the risk of mobs.

**John Eastman:**

I didn't get into that. Uh, this, this was a different department, uh, you know, e Trump himself had, uh, authorized the call up of 20,000 members of the National Guard for January 6th. I thought those things were handled. I didn't, it wasn't my role to address those things, and I didn't give them, uh, much consideration.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

But as a matter of prudence, and you're in this case, in this context, not just a lawyer, you're a political advisor uh, don't you have to take into account those kind of potential consequences?

**John Eastman:**

Well, you, you do. And to that extent, um, my earlier answer stands. It, we should not avoid taking the necessary right step to ensure the, the rightful outcome of the election be Rule of Law, and we give up much greater than the loss of a single election in a single office holder if we succumb to mob rule and lose the Rule of Law in the process.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay. Another objection I think was this, if he delays the Dems go to court, the Supreme Court, and according to somebody quoting you, you said that you'd lose nine zero.

**John Eastman:**

Yeah. So that's a distortion of the conversation. Uh,

**Tom Klingenstein:**

With whom?

**John Eastman:**

With Greg Jacob on January 5th, we were there talking about whether, uh, a decision to delay if it was challenged in court would be a non-justiciable, political question that the courts would reject. And Greg Jacob got me to agree that if he just simply rejected electors outright, which would be equally a non-justiciable, political question the Court would very likely find a way to rule anyway. And nine zero would rule against that. And I agreed, but then in that same email exchange, I said, but were he merely to delay, I think there's a fair prospect that I would win a majority of the Court saying that he could do that, or at least deciding that it was, that they wouldn't reach the question nonjusticiable.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, we've been going through the various factors that beared on whether you wanted to pursue this. The biggest one is the current circumstances in the country, the political and social condition. Now, by way of comparison, in the 1960 election, there's pretty good reason to believe that the election was stolen for Nixon. The conventional thinking, and I know you don't totally accept the conventional thinking, but the conventional thinking, uh, is the standard and people will use it to compare to Trump. The conventional thinking is Trump. No. Trump, Nixon said, “For the good of the country. I'm not gonna pursue these charges.”

**John Eastman:**

Before we get to 2020. Let's have a brief stop over in 2000.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay

**John Eastman:**

Because, because the claim is that Al Gore in conceding after Bush versus Gore rather than continuing to fight, exhibited the same kind of for the good of the country statesmanship, let's put an end to this. Um, I think that, uh, attributes to both of them, a greater magnanimity than is warranted. You look at Nixon's situation and every path, every judge in Texas, every judge in Illinois, uh, were Democrats. There was no way that he was gonna be able to bring election challenges that would result in his victory.

And so if he did challenge and loses anyway, uh, uh, then he's put the country through a lot without any, any resolution, uh, it to the, the correct judgment. Same thing with Gore. I mean, we know for a fact that his folks had looked at every path. What happens if it gets to Congress, the joint session, what happens if it gets sent to the House of Representatives and in every path he loses no matter what happens in the litigation.

So I, I don't want to give as much magnanimity of thought to either one of them. But, but let's assume the standard version and that Nixon is magnanimous, certainly not in 1960, but also not in 2000 were the stakes about the very existential threat that the country is under as great as they are. I mean, we're not talking about, you know, handing over to John Kennedy instead of Richard Nixon who's gonna deal with the Cold War.

Um, we're, we're, we are talking about whether we are gonna, as a nation completely repudiate every one of our founding principles, uh, which is what the modern Left-wing, which is in control of the Democrat Party, believes that we are the root of all evil in the world and we have to be eradicated. This is an existential threat to the very survivability, not just of our nation, but but of the, uh, example that our nation properly understood provides to the world.

That's the stakes, and Trump seems to understand that in a way a lot of Republican establishment types in Washington don't. And it's the reason he gets so much support. In the hinterland, in the flyover country. People are fed up with folks, you know, get along, go along while the country is being destroyed.

And so I think the stakes are much bigger. And, and, and that means a stolen election that thwarts the will of the people trying to correct course and get back on a path that understands the significance and the nobility of America and the American experiment is really at stake and we ought to fight for it.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

I'm assuming that if the conditions that obtained in this early sixties obtained mow, you might not have made…

**John Eastman:**

I, I may, I may have come to a different conclusion and look, our Founders lay this case out. The prudential judgment they make in the Declaration of Independence is the same one. There's actually a provision in the Declaration of Independence that says, you know, a people will suffer abuses while they remain sufferable – Tolerable while they remain tolerable.

But at some point, abuses become so intolerable that it's not only their right, but their duty to alter or abolish the existing government. So that's the question - have the abuses and the threat of abuses become so intolerable, uh, that we have to be willing to push back.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

To what degree are the differences between you and others on the fraud and the legal matters a function of a very different assessment of where we stand today.

**John Eastman:**

So I had, I had one of my longtime friends call me and say, you know, you gotta quit with this Eastman. You know, it's all a blow over. Just write a book. You'll make a lot of money and everything will be fine. And I told them, “I said, you really don't understand the stakes of what we're dealing with, and I don't know how you can miss it, because it's just there for anybody with eyes to see.”

**Tom Klingenstein:**

The narrative is Eastman and Trump tried to initiate a coup. Isn't that the narrative?

**John Eastman:**

Well, and I actually published an ararticle saying, trying to trying to stop an illegal election is not a coup, but trying to thwart a coup. Um, but the fact that that true narrative is being censored and shut down so that the false narrative can prevail, uh, is I think part of the existential threat.

And it's not just shut down, it's, it's shut down any people that raise legitimate questions about the validity of the election.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

And, and you are a good example in unfortunately this censoring and de-platforming comes almost as much from the Right as from the Left.

**John Eastman:**

Let's, let's kind of distinguish the Right. We've got, uh, what our friends at the Claremont Institute like to call Conservatism Inc. The, the establishment conservatives. Uh, they're, they're very much a part of the establishment and, and what Trump and more importantly, what, what the movement that Trump got ahead of, remember it was not called the MAGA movement until Trump came along. It was the Tea Party movement. It's the same movement. It's the same, goes back to 2008 or 2010. They don't want the federal government controlling our healthcare, you know, taking over one sixth of the nation's economy. They don't want command and control. They don't want OSHA telling me what, what kind of chair I can have in my home office.

All of, they don't want them telling me that I can't have gas stoves in my kitchen. They're tired of that. That was a tea party movement. And the Republicans were as much opposed to the Tea party, populist uprising against what was happening and coming outta Washington as the Democrats were. And Trump got ahead of that movement, and it's now called the Make America Greater Movement.

Uh, uh, uh, again, movement, but, but that's what the establishment in DC or more broadly, the northeast corridor, if you will, to bring in New York. That's, that's, that's what they wanna stop. Mm-hmm. Partly because they think they're smarter than the average American, and therefore the average American just ought to bend the knee or whatever comes out of the expert.

And this is just a fruition of that a hundred year effort. But it's, it's, uh, it's, uh, come to a rapid conclusion. I mean, it kind of, it kind of went, there were a couple of bumps when it increased quickly, but, but you look at that curve and it's been an exponential increase in the last few years.

You're gonna let 50 year old men naked into teenage girls' showers at public pools. That's one of the, or, or drag queens doing story hours to six year olds. If I had said that 10 years ago, you would've laughed me outta the room and you, you would've said, Eastman, you're way outta the limb. You're crazy.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Anything more?

**John Eastman:**

No, I, I, I would just, you know, kind of bring it all together in this way. The amount of information about illegality, I thought was clear cut. That opened the door for fraud. And I think both the statistical evidence and the anecdotal evidence, if I had about people engaging in that fraud because the door had been open to it, was significant enough to have altered the results of the election.

And then the question is gonna be, is there any legal remedy to deal with a stolen election? Um, and I put together the best legal arguments that I thought, uh, were plausible to, to, to deal with that. But I did that because I thought the stakes were high. And I thought, uh, if we do not address the illegality here, what we're gonna see is they're, I mean, they use the institutions of government to affect the outcome of that election in ways that we now know - the Twitter files, the suppression of the Hunter Biden laptop, those were done with collusion with agencies of the United States government, putting a big thumb on the scale of the election, and, and they did that when you know, when the incoming president was gonna be able to call him on it, and they continued to do it after the boss was their enemy.

Um, and, and if they can do it that time, when they then get a boss who's in agreement with them, then there are no longer, you know, any impediments to them preventing us from ever having a fair election again, which means there are no impediments to them blocking the consent of the governed, having control of the direction of the government, and we no longer are free people.

I mean, those are the stakes. And if those are the stakes, I, you know, what are you supposed to do? Just, just sit around and twiddle your thumb, eh? It would be too messy to do anything about this. I'll just. You know, and maybe when the alligators come for everybody else, they'll eat me last. No, that's not my nature. I'm the one out there on the rampart. If they eat me first, at least I've gone down fighting.

 **Tom Klingenstein:**

 Would you work for Trump again?

**John Eastman:**

You know, if the president of the United States calls on you for service to the country and there's a viable path to provide that service, I think every citizen should be able to answer that question.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Most conservatives, no, I guess I'm talking on the coasts, intellectuals would say, look, we gotta get beyond 2020. Stop litigating that and let's look forward. Isn't that the,

**John Eastman:**

Yeah, that's the mantra - certainly out of the Michigan legislature, significant portion of the Wisconsin legislature. And, and my view of that is if, in fact, what I've said is true about 2020, if you don't highlight it in order to put breaks on it, they'll do it again in 2024 and you'll never have a free election again.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Now, are, are Republicans prepared? Are they gonna,

**John Eastman:**

No, they're not. The Democrats put a hundred million dollars into their litigation efforts, their efforts to alter laws for their benefit, and the Republicans don't put any effort into it all.

They didn't put nearly enough in it in 2020, but as far as I've been able to tell, they haven't taken seriously this threat.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

So are you of the opinion that Republicans can't win because of this?

**John Eastman:**

They can't win because of this, unless they do something about it and they seem, uh, uninterested in doing what's necessary to do something about it.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Well, John, this has been fascinating. Perhaps, as I said, one day we'll call these the Eastman tapes, so I, I had a great deal of fun, and I hope you did too.

**John Eastman:**

I did too. Let's call 'em the Eastman Dialogues. It sounds, it sounds less Nixonian.

**Tom Klingenstein:**

Okay. Eastman dialogues. Any case. Thank you again.

**John Eastman:**

Thank you very much, Tom.

END OF SECTION THREE TRANSCRIPT

Tom Klingenstein / John Eastman Interview

May 5th